# The Impact of Term Limits on Michigan's Legislature

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Based on interviews with 460 legislators during a 14-year study of Michigan's Legislature

### Interviews for Seven Legislative Sessions

#### Four House Sessions:

- One pre-term-limits baseline 1998 (95 of 110 members)
- Three <u>post-term-limits sessions</u> 2000, 2002, 2004 (93, 93, and 89 respondents from the possible 110 members)

#### Three Senate Sessions:

- One <u>anticipating term limits baseline</u> 1999 (35 of 38 members)
- Two post-term-limits sessions 2003, 2007 (28 and 27 respondents from the possible 38 members)
  - The 2003 post-term-limits Senate was dominated by veterans with decades of experience in the House.
  - Pre-term-limits veterans were gone by 2007.

#### State Term Limits Provisions & Level of Professionalization


Limit in Years	Consecutive	Lifetime Ban	
8 Total	Nebraska (2006)*		
12 Total		Oklahoma (2004/2004)	
6 House/8 Senate	Now changed to 16 yrs. total.	> Arkansas (1998/2000)	
	Now changed to 12 yrs. total ————————————————————————————————————		
		Michigan (1998/2002)	
8 House/8 Senate	Arizona (2000/2000)	Missouri (2002/2002)	
	Colorado (1998/1998)		
	Florida (2000/2000)		
	Maine (1996/1996)		
	Montana (2000/2000)		
	Ohio (2000/2000)		
	South Dakota (2000/2000)		
12 House/ 12 Senate	Louisiana (2007/2007)	Nevada (2008/2008)	

States in bold type have highly professional legislatures, those in italics are moderately professional, and the others are part-time (Squire, 1992) Years in parenthese indicate date of impact in the House then the Senate. \* Nebraska has a unicameral legislature.


#### **Unfulfilled Promises of Term Limits**

- A major selling point for term limits was that it would sever cozy ties with lobbyists and Lansing insiders.
  - We found that term limits altered the people consulted during committee deliberations and during floor votes.
  - So, who is consulted when legislators face a tough floor vote or a difficult committee decision after term limits?
- Local officials are the losers.
- Interest groups are the winners, especially in the Senate.
- Staff also gain in the Senate.


## Some Source of Information Consulted During Committee Deliberations



## Floor Vote on Schools of Choice Most Important Sources Before and After Term Limits




## Floor Vote Licensing and Regulating Health Care Professionals Most Important Source Before and After Term Limits



## **Another Major Promise of Term Limits**

- Citizen legislators rather than reelection seeking politicians
  - We asked legislators what they planned to do after their tenure in office was exhausted
    - ✓ We discovered that even during their first term in office they have plans to run for another political position.
    - ✓ Representatives often plan to run for the Senate.
    - ✓ Both Representatives and Senators wanted to run for Congress, for mayor of a big city, for judicial positions, for other statewide offices like governor, attorney general, and secretary of state.
- After term limits, Michigan's legislators are more, not less, politically ambitious.

### **Political Ambition**



## Impacts of Michigan's Term Limits


#### Chamber leaders and committee chairs lack experience

- ❖ Before term limits, a Committee Chair typically served for years in the chamber and on the committee before leading it.
- After term limits first-term legislators chair committees.
- House speakers have two or at most four years of experience.

#### **Effects on Committee Dynamics**


- Conflict in committees increased.
- Leaders and others usurp chairs' prerogatives.
- Autocratic leadership style/coercion/bad personal dynamics are more common.

#### **Reasons for Committee Conflict**



Proportion of respondents making this sort of comment – open-ended questions.

#### **Managing Conflict in Committees**




## Term Limits Impacts on Leadership

#### With inexperienced committee chairs (after term limits):

- 1. Legislators complain that chamber leaders and committee chairs are autocratic, and they report more conflict in committees.
- 2. Legislators **rely on committee chairs less** for information about a difficult issue.
- 3. Legislators say that leaders usurp the power of committee chairs if chairs do not comply with their wishes. Also money has a bigger impact on who becomes the chair.
- 4. Even with single party control, inexperienced leaders have a **harder time negotiating** with the other chamber and with the executive branch.

#### Sources of Chamber Leader Influence




### Impacts of Michigan's Term Limits


- Relationships take time to develop, but term limits truncate time.
  - Less time spent building coalitions across party lines.
  - Relationships between legislature and governor decline.
  - Relationships between the two chambers decline.
  - Friendship networks in the house look very different.
    - Groups of friends are rare and occur only within the same political party.
    - Friendship groups before term limits reflected power.
    - Friendship groups after term limits are mutual aid clusters.

#### **House Friendship Networks**


Friends 1997 House



**Powerbrokers** 





Friends 1999 House



Friends 2001 House


Tea and Sympathy





Friends 2003 House

Tea – No sympathy



Blue dots for Democrats
Red dots for Republicans
Fuschia Squares for Partisan Hubs
Crosshatched Squared for Bipartisan Hubs

## **Network Relationships**

#### • Friendship:

- In Michigan we found fewer clusters of friends who can make deals and more clusters of the disenfranchised and ostracized.
  - This has decreased the time legislators spend working across party lines to build bipartisan coalitions to pass legislation.

#### • Influence:

 In Michigan, we found less informal influence (people who hold no formal role) and more influence for legislators who hold a formal role (speakers, etc.)

#### Information Flows:

 In Michigan, we found information networks that were easily controlled by one or a few actors and vulnerable to becoming decoupled.

P	Priority	<b>Legislators Place on Tas</b>	sks Bef	ore and After Term Limi	ts by (	Chamber	
<b>House Before Term Limits</b>		House After Term Limits		Senate Before Term Limits		Senate After Term Limits	
Rank and Activity	Mean Diff.	Rank and Activity	Mean Diff.	Rank and Activity	Mean Diff.	Rank and Activity	Mean Diff.
		<u>Hi</u>	gh Prid	orityTasks			
1 Talk to Voters	0.65	1 Talk to Voters	0.78	1 Attend District Events	0.68	1 Help Voters	0.59
2 Help Voters	0.48	2 Attend District	0.62	2 Help Voters	0.53	2 Talk to Voters	0.57
3 Attend District	0.46	3 Help Voters	0.56			3 Attend District Events	0.48
		<u>Mode</u>	rate Pi	riority Tasks			
4 Study Proposed Laws	0.15	4 Get Money for District	0.20	3 Develop New Laws	0.39	4 Study Proposed Laws	0.22
		5 Study Proposed Laws	0.17	4 Get Money for District	0.38	5 Get Money for District	0.16
				5 Talk to Voters	0.33		
				6 Study Proposed Laws	0.12		
		Aver	age Pri	iority Tasks		A	
5 Get Money for District	0.07	6 Own Party Coalitions	-0.07	7 Bipartisan Coalitions	0.03	6 Develop New Laws	0.01
6 Bipartisan Coalitions	-0.06			\			
7 Own Party Coalitions	-0.06						
		<u>Lo</u>	w Prio	<u>rity Tasks</u>			
8 Develop New Laws	-0.13	7 Develop New Laws	-0.18	8 Own Party Coalitions	-0.39	7 Own Party Coalitions	-0.23
	1	8 Bipartisan Coalitions	-0.31		1	8 Bipartisan Coalitions	-0.35
		9 Attend Lansing Events	-0.35				
		<u> </u>	<u>Avoide</u>	d Tasks			
9 Attend Lansing Events	-0.41	10 Fundraising	-0.65	9 Attend Lansing Events	-0.62	9 Fundraising	-0.45
		11 Monitor Agencies	-0.79	10 Fundraising		10 Attend Lansing	-0.47
10 Monitor Agencies	-0.52	11 Mullion Agencies	0.17	10 1 unuraising	0.72	10 micha Lansing	
10 Monitor Agencies 11 Fundraising	-0.60			11 Monitor Agencies		11 Monitor Agencies	-0.55
11 Fundraising Number of Respondents:	-0.60 House		ter 240	11 Monitor Agencies to 256 and Senate Before	-0.73 Limits	11 Monitor Agencies 31 to 33; After 52 to 54	-0.55

## More Impacts of Michigan's Term Limits

- Time spent monitoring state agencies declined in the House.
  - There is not much political payoff through monitoring for politically ambitious legislators looking for their next job.
  - It takes a lot of substantive knowledge about a specific state agency and its programs to monitor agencies.
  - ❖ It takes contacts and ties within the agency to know what to ask about.

# Ways to Mitigate the Effects of Term Limits

#### A Ballot Proposal

- Lengthen term limits to limit total time in either chamber.
  - ✓ Let Michigan's legislators serve all fourteen years in one chamber rather than 6 years in the lower chamber and 8 years in the upper chamber.
    - This doesn't divide nicely into four-year Senate terms, so . . .
  - ✓ In California, the ballot proposal provided for 12 years total in either chamber.
  - ✓ In Arkansas, the ballot proposal provided for 16 years in either chamber.

# Ways Mitigate the Effects of Term Limits

- Build relationships among legislators across party lines.
  - A role for interest groups and lobbyists:
    - ✓ Organize events—retreats, lunches, sponsor amateur sports teams
  - A role for chamber leaders and non-partisan staff:
    - ✓ Road trips to inspect state infrastructure, facilities, and programs